Miami Hired a New Coach and Changed Almost Nothing Else

Seven wins sounds like a team that held its own. The point differential tells a different story. Miami finished 2025 at minus-77 — which, run through the points-per-win conversion our model uses, produces a structural win total of 6.3. The Dolphins won seven games with the underlying performance of a six-win team. That 0.7-win luck surplus is real, but it's the kind of gift that doesn't repeat on schedule.

The one-score record was 4-3, a slight positive. But close games are mostly noise — the signal lives in the point differential, accumulated across all 17 weeks. Minus-77 is not a bad-luck number. It is a bad-football number. The gap between what Miami produced and what it needed to produce in order to be a legitimate playoff contender was substantial, and no change of fortune in tight games is going to close it.

The honest version of 2025: this was a 6.3-win team that found an extra half-win in the standings and is heading into 2026 with a new head coach, a new quarterback, and a cap sheet carrying $94 million in future proration. That is the situation. The rest of the offseason is about whether the moves narrow the underlying gap or widen it.

Start with the passing offense, because it is the only unit that did not actively cost Miami yards on a per-play basis. The Dolphins posted an offensive passing EPA of +0.01 per attempt — barely above zero, but above zero. The rushing offense came in at -0.03 EPA per carry, which means the run game was, on average, a negative transaction. A team that cannot threaten defenses on the ground puts enormous pressure on its quarterback to keep plays alive, and 0.01 per attempt is not a quarterback who is doing that at a high level.

The defense was the larger problem. Opponents generated +0.15 EPA per passing attempt against Miami's secondary — that is a genuinely poor number, the kind that shows up when a pass defense is being attacked successfully on a consistent basis. The run defense was less catastrophic at +0.03 EPA per carry allowed, but neither unit was in the black. When your offense converts third and fourth downs at 37.7 percent and your red zone EPA per play is a thin +0.02, you are a team that works hard to get into scoring position and then leaves points on the field with regularity.

Then-coach Mike McDaniel — who is no longer with the organization — was actually the quiet bright spot in the decision data. His decision index shows 81 percent agreement with the model's recommendations, and he cost the team roughly 0.109 expected wins through in-game choices over the season. That is a below-average loss rate. The go-for-it rate under McDaniel (13.1 percent) sat well below the model's recommendation of 28.6 percent, which suggests there was room to be more aggressive — but the broader decision-making picture was competent, and in a 7-10 year, competent process is something worth noting before it walks out the door.

The most consequential arrival is Malik Willis, signed from Tennessee for $22.5 million per year over three years — a deal priced at the 92nd percentile of the quarterback market. Willis is 26 with an aging multiplier of 1.05, meaning the production curve projects him to be slightly more capable next year than last. The exit cost is $13.4 million in dead money if the deal goes sideways. The contract verdict is WATCH: it becomes good value if Willis produces as a top-5 quarterback in 2026; it becomes an overpay if he does not crack the top 25. That is an unusually wide range of outcomes for a $22.5 million commitment, and it is the defining bet of Miami's offseason. Aaron Brewer arrives at center from Arizona at $17.5 million per year — the 98th percentile of the center market — on a deal with a $10 million dead-cap exit in 2028. The verdict is WATCH, graded on price discipline: it reads wrong only if the center market's top of book moves substantially past this number by 2027.

On the other side of the ledger, Bradley Chubb left for Buffalo ($14.5 million per year, 1.16 market wins), Cole Strange departed for the Chargers ($6.5 million, 0.46 market wins), Julian Hill signed with New England ($5 million, 0.33 market wins), and Larry Borom went to Detroit ($5 million, 0.33 market wins). The net offseason result on a market-wins basis is +0.99 — a modest positive driven almost entirely by the Willis signing. On a production basis, where we can actually grade what the new players have done on the field, the net is zero: Willis and Brewer have no production history in these roles to price against.

Incoming head coach Jeff Hafley has no NFL head coaching record to evaluate. Our model prices him at the league average and will grade from Week 1. McDaniel's decision rate was 0.3 expected wins lost per season; Hafley enters at 0.37 by the league-average baseline — a projected -0.07 decision wins before a single snap is played. That is a small number, but it is a cost, not a benefit, and it belongs in the accounting.

The draft class is led by Kadyn Proctor, an offensive tackle out of Alabama taken 12th overall (1.5 chart wins), and Chris Johnson, a cornerback from San Diego State at pick 27 (1.12 chart wins). The second round brought linebacker Jacob Rodriguez from Texas Tech (0.89 chart wins), and the third round added wide receivers Caleb Douglas and Chris Bell (0.64 and 0.53 chart wins, respectively), along with tight end Will Kacmarek from Ohio State (0.54 chart wins). Later additions include linebackers Trey Moore and Kyle Louis, safety Michael Taaffe, receiver Kevin Coleman Jr., tight end Seydou Traore, guard DJ Campbell, and defensive end Max Llewellyn. The class totals 6.44 chart wins across 13 picks. Compensatory picks projected for 2027 (a fifth and a seventh) add another 0.37. Three new contracts carry WATCH verdicts; Devon Achane's four-year, $16 million per year extension is the exception — rated FAIR PRICE, with his production at the 93rd percentile against pay at the 49th.

The honest net is approximately neutral, and neutral is not what a 6.3-win team needs. The market-wins math says +0.99, but that number leans heavily on the Willis signing, which carries no production history to back it. A quarterback signed at the 92nd percentile of the market who is asked to be the engine of a rebuild is either the solve or the problem — and right now, we simply do not know which.

The cap structure is where the concern sharpens. Miami's three most underfunded position groups by our spending z-scores are tight end (-1.87), wide receiver (-1.65), and offensive line (-1.59). The draft addressed offensive line at the top with Proctor, and added receiver depth in rounds three and five, but those are developmental bets, not immediate solutions. The $94 million in future proration sitting on the books constrains how aggressively the team can address those gaps in-season or next offseason. When your quarterback is earning 2.4 percent of the cap and the groups he throws to are among the most underfunded in the league, the math is working against him before the snap count begins.

The Achane extension is the one unambiguous bright spot. A running back producing at the 93rd percentile for 49th-percentile money on a contract with a manageable exit is the definition of cap efficiency. The aging multiplier of 0.94 flags some natural decline risk at 25, but the price accounts for it. The rest of the ledger — three WATCH verdicts, a coaching change that projects slightly negative on decisions, and three deeply underfunded skill-position groups — leans toward hurt rather than help. Not dramatically, not irreversibly, but the arrow points the wrong way.

The arithmetic is straightforward. Miami's 2025 point differential projects a structural base of 6.3 wins. The offseason moves add zero production wins — the new players have no gradable production history in these roles. The coaching change costs 0.07 decision wins by our league-average baseline for Hafley against McDaniel's historical rate. The result: a structural projection of 6.3 wins for 2026. That is an accounting projection from the ledger, not a betting model output and not a pick.

The falsifier is simple: if Miami wins nine games or more in 2026, this read is wrong — either Willis outperformed the uncertainty his contract carries, the defense improved substantially beyond what the roster investment suggests, or Hafley graded well above league average in his first year. Any of those would be genuinely good news for the franchise. If they finish at seven wins again, the ledger will have been directionally correct and the underlying gap will have gone another year without closing.

Julian Hill's departure leaves 20 targets and 31 PPR points on the table at tight end — not a large opportunity, but one that lands in a group the cap data rates as the most underfunded on the roster. The most likely candidates to absorb those looks are Kacmarek and Traore from the draft class, neither of whom has professional production to evaluate. The opportunity exists; the efficiency data to build a sleeper case does not, yet.

The more interesting fantasy question is what Willis does with the volume that comes with the job. He logged 51.2 PPR points in 2025 in a backup role — a floor built on scrambling value rather than passing production. As a starter, the target share and designed run opportunities both expand. The case for him as a fantasy asset is the rushing floor; the ceiling depends entirely on whether the passing game develops in a way that his supporting cast, priced well below league average at receiver and tight end, may not support.

Achane is the clearest value anchor on this roster. His per-opportunity efficiency ranked at the 93rd percentile last season, and the contract — sitting at 1.0 percent of the cap against that production — means the market has not yet fully priced what he does. For DFS purposes, that combination of efficiency and price separation is what a legitimate sleeper argument actually looks like. The caveat is the offensive line: Proctor needs to develop, and the group's cap z-score of -1.59 suggests the run-blocking infrastructure around Achane remains a work in progress.

Everything above traces to a live instrument, and the receipts stay public: the GM boards carry Jeff Hafley's decision card, the team's cap posture ($94M already charged to future caps), and every contract verdict with its falsifier and review date — including Malik Willis (WATCH), Aaron Brewer (WATCH), Jordyn Brooks (WATCH), Devon Achane (FAIR PRICE). When the season grades these reads, the grades post whether they flatter us or not.